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THE TIMING OF PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
AND THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
RICHARD A. MANN* AND MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS**

O Uniform Commercial ifCodenot istheto primary,
purposes of Article 9 of the
provide a simple and unified structure
NE OF THE PRIMARY,

within which modem secured financing transactions can be conducted with
less expense and greater certainty than under prior law.' However, the
enactment of Article 9 hopelessly dated2 the preference provisions" of the
1938 Bankruptcy Act.' For example, Article 9 has greatly facilitated the
use of the so-called "floating lien" 5 outside the bankruptcy context, but,
because of the incompatibility between Article 9's language and the preCode terminology of the Bankruptcy Act's preference provisions, it was
possible that floating liens were in serious jeopardy in bankruptcy proceedings.6 Such inconsistencies between the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Bankruptcy Act prompted the National Bankruptcy Conference to
establish a committee to coordinate the two statutes in 1966.' The 1970
report of this "Gilmore Committee" strongly argued the need for a revision
*Associate Professor of Business Law, School of Business Administration, University of
North Carolina (Chapel Hill). B.S., 1968, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill).
J.D., 1973, Yale University.
**Associate Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., 1968,
Johns Hopkins University. J.D., 1973, Columbia University. LL.M., 1975, George Washington
University. S.J.D., 1981, George Washington University.
I See U.C.C. § 9-101, Official Comment.
2 Report of the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code (1970), as reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 6164 [hereinafter
cited as "Gilmore Report," with all page citations to the U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
More specifically, the report stated:
If the structure of security law had remained as it was, the compromise represented by
the 1950 revision of § 60 [of the Bankruptcy Act] would have worked perfectly well.
With the general enactment of the Code, including Article 9, the situation was radically
altered. Arguably, Article 9 contained little or nothing that was revolutionary, or even
novel, as a matter of substance. The Article 9 terminology, on the other hand, represented a sharp break with the past. The difficulty of making the two statutes (§ 60
and Article 9) mesh or track with each other was immediately apparent.
Id. at 6167.
8 Chandler Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976)

of 11 U.S.C. (Supp.

(current version codified in scattered sections

m 1979)). For the current version at the preference provisions specific-

ally, see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp.

m

1979).

4 For a further discussion of these preference provisions, see notes 17-32 infra and accompanying text.
5
"floating lien" is an interest covering property of the debtor obtained after completion
of the security agreement, one which "floats over" such after-acquired property. U.C.C. §

9-204(1) specifically authorizes security interests covering such collateral.
0 See Mann and Phillips, Floating Liens as Preferential Transfers Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, 85 CoM. L.J. 7, 9-12 (1980).

1 Gilmore Report, supra note 2, at 6164.
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of the Bankruptcy Act.8 Eight years later Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Reform Act,9 which took effect on October 1, 1979. One of the aims of
the Reform Act is to refine, if not redefine, the relationship between Article
9 and bankruptcy law.
This article will examine this new relationship as it applies to a
specific problem created by the interaction between Article 9 and bankruptcy
law: the timing of a "transfer" when a security interest is challenged as
preferential in a bankruptcy proceeding. Resolution of this question is often
critical for determining the secured party's ability to recover assets pledged
as collateral when the debtor goes into bankruptcy. The article will begin by
explaining the "timing of transfer" problem as it arose under Article 9
and the Bankruptcy Act. Then it will describe and evaluate the new solution provided by the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
The Timing Problem Under the Bankruptcy Act
Article 9 has considerably simplified the requirements for acquiring
an effective security interest. These are set out in section 9-203 (1)," which
requires that: (1) there be a security agreement signed by the debtor,
(2) value be given by the creditor, and (3) the debtor have rights in the
collateral. 1 Once these requirements have been met, the security interest
attaches: that is, it is enforceable against the debtor." In addition to desiring
a security interest enforceable against the debtor, the seller is particularly
interested in protection against third party claimants (including a trustee
in bankruptcy)." 3 This can be accomplished by perfecting the security interest, which typically entails filing " a financing statement in the appropriate
"See

generally id. at 6164-79

9 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Supp. M 1979).
20U.C.C. § 9-203(1) provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a collecting bank, Section 8-321 on security interests in securities and Section 9-113 on a
security interest arising under the Article on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable
against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach

unless
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the
debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral
and in addition, when the security interest covers crops growing or to be grown
or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned; and
(b) value has geen given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
1 As the previous note states, § 9-203(1) (a) also allows attachment by possession, but this
possibility is not significant here.
12 The relevant provision is U.C.C. § 9-203(2), which provides that "[a] security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the events specified in subsection (1) have taken place unless
explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching."
Is "[An unperfected secured party will invariably have to eat from the general creditors'

trough in bankruptcy." WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCiAL CODE 918 (2d ed. 1980).
1 Dut see U.C.C. § 9-302, which lists a number of exceptions to the filing requirement.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4
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place.15 The security interest is deemed to be perfected once it has attached
8
to the property and all the applicable steps for perfection have taken place."
For the most part, Article 9's simplified procedure for obtaining a
security interest enforceable against both the debtor and third party claimants has proven to be successful outside of bankruptcy. Prior to 1978, however, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, in particular those of section
60,' became applicable if the debtor entered into bankruptcy. This section
was intended to invalidate certain "preferential" transfers from the debtor
8
to favored creditors before the date of bankruptcy.' As will become apparent below, a security interest can be so regarded. Section 60's key provision was section 60(a)( 1) , which defined a "preference" as:
a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of a debtor to
or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months
before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable
such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class.
Under section 60(b), a preference could "be avoided by the trustee if the
creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby . . . has, at the time when
the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is in20
solvent.1
Thus, establishing a preference was treated as involving eight necessary
elements: (1) a transfer; (2) of the debtor's property; (3) made or suffered by the debtor; (4) within four months of bankruptcy; (5) to or for
the benefit of a creditor; (6) for or on account of an antecedent debt; (7)
made or suffered while the debtor was insolvent; and (8) enabling the trans'5The appropriate place depends upon the type of collateral and which alternative of U.C.C.

§ 9-401(1) (i.e., local or central filing) has been adopted in a jurisdiction.
1OU.C.C. § 9-303(1).
17 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976)
(current version codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (Supp.
M 1979)). Also, section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) (current
version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(e), 544(a) (Supp. M 1979), which gave the trustee the
status of "ideal lien creditor" as of this date of bankruptcy, enabled the trustee to defeat
an unperfected security interest because under U.C.C. § 9-301(b) a lien creditor defeats
a party with an unperfected interest. WmTE & SuMMERS, supra note 13, at 994 & n.10.
1s Early attacks upon the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 were soundly repulsed on the floor of
Congress by harking back to the evils of grab-law which had led to the almost ceaseless search for a satisfactory Bankruptcy Act during the two decades preceding 1898.

[footnote omitted] Besides the evils of the disturbance of business due to the race of
diligence with its accompanying midnight attachments and all the other paraphernalia of
the race, Congress was reminded of the chilling effect upon credit of the practice of
insolvents transferring their assets to friends and relatives.
MAcLAcHAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 284 (1956).

'9 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. m (1979)).
(current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 550-51 (Supp. m 1979)). For the Bankruptcy Reform Act's dilution of this requirement, see notes 75-78 intra and accompanying
text. by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
Published
20Id. § 96(b)
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feree to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor
of the same class. 21 And satisfaction of the "reasonable cause to believe"
test rendered such a preference voidable by the trustee.2 2 A perfected Article
9 security interest, which otherwise would have been immune from bankruptcy attack, was capable of meeting these tests and thus of being avoided
as preferential. The taking of such an interest qualified as a "transfer"
under the Bankruptcy Act's broad definition of this term. " And such an
interest obviously was "of the debtor's property", "made or suffered by the
debtor", and "to or for the benefit of a creditor". Whether this transfer was
made or suffered while the debtor was insolvent would vary with the individual case, but usually posed little problem for the bankruptcy trustee.
Also, since the successful secured creditor would be able to obtain the
full value of the property securing the debt, there was little doubt that he
would fare better than other creditors of the same class. Thus, the key
questions under section 60 were usually whether the transfer occurred
within four months of bankruptcy and whether the transfer was "for or
on account of an antecedent debt." To answer each question," it was
necessary to ask when the transfer actually took place. And it is here that the
disharmony between Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Act produced severe
problems.
The Bankruptcy Act established the following tests for determining
when the transfer was deemed to have been made. First:
Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not
more than twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording,
delivery, or some other act is required, and compliance therewith is
had within such stated period of time; or where (B) the applicable
law specifies no such stated period of time or where such stated period of
time is more than twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had
within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed
to be made or suffered at the time of the transfer. 6
But if compliance was not had within the relevant time period, the time
of the transfer was the time of perfection.2 7 This language (Paragraph I")
worked reasonably well when applied to the filing-type statutes which were
customary under pre-code law. 8 These statutes typically provided a specific
21

MACLACHAN, supra note 18, at 285.

Id.
E.g., Wmrr & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 918.
24
See 11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. m 1979));
and WrrE & SUmMERS, supra note 13, at 1002.
25 Also, the timing question occasionally might have been important
for determining whether
the debtor was insolvent when the transfer took place.
26 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(I) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. HI 1979)).
[hereinafter called "Paragraph ."]
2
7 d. § 96(a)(7)(H1) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. I 1979)).
28 2 GrLmoRn, SEcuRTY I T E RS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1326 (1965).
22

23

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4
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time period within which filing was to be made." Under Paragraph I, if the
grace period specified by the state statute was 21 days or less, it controlled; if greater than 21 days, it was cut back to 21 days; and if no grace
period was provided, the Bankruptcy Act provided a 21-day grace period.
Thus, if the secured party perfected within the applicable grace period, the
time of the transfer for Bankruptcy Act purposes was the time of the "actual"
transfer: that is, the time of attachment or the time when the creditor
obtained his interest in the debtor's property. If at this time some consideration (e.g. the loan secured by the debtor's property) passed from the
creditor to the debtor, the transfer could not have been "for or on account
of an antecedent debt" and there was no preference. Also, if the security
agreement took place before the four-month preference period and perfection occurred within that period but also within the grace period, there could
be no preference because the time of the transfer was the time of the security
agreement."0 But if the creditor failed to perfect within the grace period,
the security interest was likely to be regarded as preferential because in
this case the time of the transfer was the time of perfection."' This of course
assumes that the secured party also had reason to believe in the debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer.3 2
The differing policies and language of Article 9 of the Code, however,
introduced difficulties in the application of Paragraph I. Article 9 generally
provides no grace period for security interests in order to encourage the
greater use of advance filing authorized by the Code."3 For instance, U.C.C.
section 9-301 (1) (b)I makes an unperfected security interest subordinate
to the rights of a lien creditor, 5 thus giving the secured party who delays
perfection no protection. 0 Purchase money security interests,' on the other
29 Id.
30 Suppose for instance that C obtained a security interest from D

(and thus attached)
on July 15, but did not perfect until August 3. Suppose also that D went bankrupt on
December 1. If, say, a 21-day grace period applied, the time of the transfer would have
been the time of attachment, and not the time of perfection. Thus, the transfer would have
occurred outside the four-month preference period, despite the fact that perfection occurred
within that period.

note 27 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 20 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
3 GLMORE, supra note 28, at 1327.
34 "[Aln unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of . . . (b) a person who
becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).
35 In relevant part, U.C.C. § 9-301(3) defines a lien creditor as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes
81See

32

a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition."

-This was also true with respect to the trustee, who under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(e), 544(a)
(Supp. 111 (1979)), became an "ideal lien creditor" as of the date of bankruptcy. See WrTE,
& SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 918, and note 17 supra.
37 A "purchase money security interest" typically occurs when: 1) the seller of the collateral
uses the collateral to secure payment of its price; or 2) a party financing a sale uses as
collateral the property obtained by the debtor in the sale. See U.C.C. § 9-107. The first
version of the common law conditional sale. In both cases, of 5
involves the Code's1982
situation
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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hand, have been specifically granted a ten-day grace period by section
9-301 (2):
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security
interest before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession
of the collateral, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in
bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the time the security
interest attaches and the time of filing.
Under this section a purchase money security interest that is filed within
ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral will cut off
any intervening rights of a lien creditor "8 because the filing "relates back"
to the time when the security interest attached."9 This section reflects the
manifest intent of the Code drafters to favor purchase money security interests over non-purchase money security interests."
Interpretative difficulties arose when the Bankruptcy Act's Paragraph
I test was applied to this Code language. The purpose behind the Bankruptcy Act's test was to allow the secured party a reasonable amount of
time to perfect the transfer.' This policy conflicted with section 9-301(1)'s
goal of encouraging immediate or advance filing of non-purchase money
security interests. Since Article 9 does not provide a specified time period
for perfecting non-purchase money security interests and since Paragraph
I seemed to contemplate this possibility," bankruptcy commentators had
generally concluded that a 21-day grace period was appropriate. " This
allowed a lien creditor to defeat the non-purchase money secured party
when the trustee could not do so. Professor Lawrence King analyzed the
situation as follows:
Assume a loan is made and a security agreement is entered into on
January 2, but that the financing statement which is required for full
perfection is not fied until January 20. The debtor files a petition in
bankruptcy on May 15. If there had been a creditor who obtained a
judgment lien on the collateral between January 2 and January 20,
course, the key factor differentiating the purchase money security interest from other sorts
of interests is that the property purchased is used as collateral.

38 And those of the § 70(c) trustee as well, even where bankruptcy occurred between attachment and perfection. See WarrE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 998. On § 70(c), see
notes 17 & 36 supra.
sgKing, Voidable Preferences and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 925,

931-32 (1967). This raises another interpretative issue: from what moment does the grace

period begin? Paragraph I makes this time "twenty-one days after the transfer," while U.C.C.

§ 9-301(2) makes it "within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral."

Again, the terminology of the two statutes is dissimilar. For a possible implication of this,
see note 53 infra.
40
E.g., GILMORE, supra note 28, at 1328.
41 King, supra note 39, at 928.
42 See the text accompanying note 26 supra.
43 1 COOGAN, HOGAN AND VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER TH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, chs. 9 & 19 (1966); GILMORE, supra note 28, at 1327.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4

6

Fall, 1981]

Mann and Phillips: Timing of Perfection of Security Interests
TIMING OF PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS

by application of section 9-301 [(1) (b)] the judgment creditor would
clearly prevail over the secured creditor. The result is not so certain
under the Bankruptcy Act. Most authorities take the position that the
trustee cannot set aside the security interest when the financing statement has been filed within twenty-one days after the security interest
was granted. Under section 60(a) (7) (I) (B), therefore, the transfer
must be deemed made for a contemporaneous consideration on January
2, more than four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."
Even the most plausible reading of Paragraph I led to strange results for the
non-purchase money secured party under Article 9.45 A possible way out
of the dilemma was to view section 9-301 (1) as giving a specified period of
zero days,40 in which case the secured party could not have triumphed. Professor King further stated:
If . . . the grace period is inapplicable, the transfer must be deemed
made on January 20. Two crucial elements of a voidable preference
could therefore be proven: (1) the date of filing, May 15, is within four
months of the transfer; and (2) since no consideration passed on January 20, the transfer was for an antecedent debt. (The other elements
comprise fact questions not material to the present discussion.) It seems
clear that the result in bankruptcy proceedings would differ from that
under the Code only if the twenty-one day grace period is applicable. 7
But this symmetry in treatment of the trustee and the lien creditor was
achieved only through a very forced reading of section 9-301 and Paragraph 1.48
Even greater problems arose when the Code's rules regarding purchase
money security interests were considered. Here, the main difficulty was a
disparity in the status of different types of secured parties. Since the Code
provides purchase money security interests with a "stated period" of ten days
in which to be perfected, purchase money security interests would only have
enjoyed a ten-day grace period under the language of Paragraph I. If it is
assumed, as the dominant view did assume," that non-purchase money
security interests got a 21-day grace period, purchase money security interests would have had a shorter grace period than non-purchase money security interests." But this result clearly undermined the Code's policy of preferring
44

King, supra note 39, at 929.

45 Section 70(c), it might be noted, would have been of no use to the trustee in this case,

because the secured party perfected before the date of bankruptcy. See notes 17 & 36 supra.
"GLMoRE, supra note 28, at 1327-28. See note 54 infra.
47King, supra note 39, at 929.
48

See the text following note 55 infra.

49 See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
5
0 'Ths is an obviously anomalous result since the purchase-money party, who is singled out
for favored treatment under Article 9,gets the axe under § 60(a) (7) 11. days sooner than his
non-purchase-money competitor." GILMORE, supra note 28, at 1328.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
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purchase money security interests. It also meant, once more, that a creditor's

priority in cases outside bankruptcy differed from that obtained in a bankruptcy proceeding."
This anomalous disparity between purchase money and non-purchase
money security interests could have been avoided in at least two ways. The
first solution was to interpret Paragraph I as permitting a 21-day grace
period for purchase money security interests also.52 This solution would
have given equal treatment to purchase money security interests and nonpurchase money security interests, but it took interpretative liberties with
the Bankruptcy Act and section 9-301 (2)." The second solution was to

interpret section 9-301 ( 1) as providing non-purchase money security interests
with a stated period of zero days.5" This solution would have extended
51

That is, the relation-back language of § 9-301(2) allowed the purchase money secured party
to defeat a lien creditor, while not affording this advantage to other secured parties. In
bankruptcy, though, the purchase money secured party would receive less of grace period
within which to defeat the trustee than would the nonpurchase money secured party.
52 1 COOGAN, HOGAN AND VAGTS, supra note 43, § 9.03(5) (c), at 995. Professor Gilmore
commented on this suggestion as follows:
If we accept the proposition that a non-purchase-money secured party gets the full
21 days for filing, we come next to the observation that the purchase-money secured
party gets only 10 days when § 9-301(2) is read against the "stated period" language of §
60(a) (7). This is an obviously anomalous result since the purchase-money party, who
is singled out for favored treatment under Article 9, gets the axe under § 60(a)(7)
11 days sooner than his non-purchase-money competitor. The anomaly can be avoided by
saying that, despite the "stated period" of § 9-301(2), the holder of a purchase-money
interest, like the holder of any other interest, should have the full 21 days. This suggestion has, indeed, been made, and by an eminently respectable source, but there is
some difficulty in squaring it with the (at this point) quite precise language of §
60(a) (7).
GiMoRE, supra note 28, at 1328.
53 For one thing, § 9-301(2) obviously gives a ten-day grace period. See the text following
note 37 supra. And Paragraph I clearly contemplated such a grace period. See the text accompanying note 26 supra. However, § 9-301(2) dates the grace period from the time the
debtor receives possession of the collateral, and not from the time of transfer. See note 39
supra. Apparently aware of this, Gilmore noted the following possibilities:
Or are we to say that, at least in such a case, § 9-301(2) does not "specify" a "stated
period" running from the date of transfer so that the purchase-money party who delays
delivery gets 21 days while the party who makes an immediate delivery gets only 10
days? Perhaps the suggestion that all purchase-money filing should have the benefit of
the 21-day period can be reinforced by the observation that § 9-301(2), read literally,
does not specify a stated period running from the date of transfer and therefore should
not be held to cut back the full period in any case.
GILMoRE, supra note 28, at 1329.
54 GLMORE, supra note 28, at 1327-28:
If the underlying policy of § 60(a) (7) is thought to be the adoption of any state filing
requirement which is shorter than the 21-day maximum, it would be entirely possible
to conclude that any filing delay after the security interest had attached would make
the transaction a transfer for antecedent debt under § 60(a) (7). The language of §
60(a) (7) is that the filing must be made within whatever "stated period," less than 21
days, may be "specified" in the "applicable law." Article 9 could be taken as a statute
which specified a stated period of zero days.
This argument has been amplified as follows by Professor King:
Nevertheless, the problem is capable of a logical solution. The Bankruptcy Act defers
to state law for a determination of when a security interest is perfected .... .. Under
state law there is no period of grace for perfecting non-purchase-money security interests and there is a ten-day grace period for perfecting purchase-money security inhttps://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4
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favored treatment to purchase money security interests.5" But it also prob-

ably involved tenuous interpretations of section 9-301 (1) (which does not
explicitly say anything of the sort) and of Paragraph I (which contemplates
situations in which the state statute says nothing about a grace period)."
Confronting these anomalies, Gilmore concluded that this problem "is not
capable of a logical solution; the courts may as well decide the case by
rolling the dice."' 7 The only satisfactory way out of the impasse was a clarifying amendment to either the Bankruptcy Act or Article 9.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act Solution
The problems discussed above have been addressed-and largely resolved-by the Bankruptcy Reform Act. After briefly sketching the legislative history of the Reform Act," this section will describe the solution it
provides. On July 24, 1970, Congress established the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study federal bankruptcy legislation and to recommend necessary changes."9 After a two-year effort, the
Commission submitted its Report to Congress on July 30, 1973. ° Not long

after this, bills embracing the Commission's recommendations for a new
federal bankruptcy law were introduced in both the House6 ' and the Seninterests. For purposes of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, the same conclusions should
be reached in a bankruptcy proceeding. Such an interpretation does not derogate from
the concept of federal supremacy over state law, since the Bankruptcy Act clearly
refers to state law for application of the transfer test.
King, supra note 39, at 932-33 (emphasis in original).
55 This is so because purchase money security interests would still get the 9-301(2) ten-day

grace period under this reading of section 9-301.
56
See the text accompanying note 26 supra, and note 34 supra.
57 GILMORE, supra note 28, at 1329. Expressing a similar idea is the Gilmore Report, supra
note 2, at 6170:
The Committee also feels that there is much to be said for a current revision of § 60
quite apart from the desirability of arriving at a fair settlement of the problem just
discussed. Present § 60, as even its dearest friends will concede, is, as a matter of
language, intolerably and unnecessarily complex. Furthermore, as has already been
pointed out, present § 60 was, necessarily, written in pre-Code terminology, which
leads to difficult, indeed logically insoluble, problems of statutory construction in applying the § 60 rules to Article 9 security interests. For example, present § 60a(7)
deals with the problem of late filing of security interests subject to a filing perfection
requirement. The Article 9 filing system is quite different from the filing systems set
up under the pre-Code security statutes. For one thing, there is no grace period for
filing under Article 9, except for purchase money security interests which get a 10-day
grace period. Present § 60a(7) clearly assumes that all filing statutes have grace periods
for all required filings. Consequently no one really knows what § 60a(7) means when
it is applied to Article 9 filings and, indeed, the commentators who have discussed
the point have proposed divergent and contradictory solutions.
5
8 Summaries of this history can be found at 124 CONG. Rc. S 14718-19 (daily ed. Sept. 7,
1978.) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 123 CoNG. REc. H 11700-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977)
(remarks of Rep. Butler).
5"Pub.
L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
6
0REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
61 H.R.
10,792, 93d Cong., 1st1982
Sess. (1973).
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ate.6 2 There was little immediate action on these bills, and they were reintroduced without significant amendment in 1975.3 At this time, however,
parallel bills reflecting the recommendations of the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges were also introduced."4 House subcommittee hearings
on both its bills began in 1975 and continued into 1976,15 while the corresponding Senate hearings were completed during 1975.66 After further
committee work-some of it in consultation with the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges and the National Bankruptcy Conference-revised
bills were introduced in the House6 7 and Senate 8 in January and October of
1977, respectively. The House passed its version on February 1, 1978, and
the Senate did so on September 7, 1978. After some work to reconcile
differences between the two bills, the Bankruptcy Reform Act finally became
law-on November 6, 1978.60 The portions of the Act relevant here took
effect on October 1, 1979.70
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 1 the successor to Bankruptcy Act section 60, substantially modifies its predecessor's treatment of
voidable preferences. Many of the changes it makes are responses to the
problems created by section 60's confused interaction with Article Nine of
the Uniform Commercial Code." The operative provision of section 547 is its
subsection (b), which generally preserves section 60's listing" of the elements
necessary to establish a preference." However, section 547(b) does change
S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
64 See H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
16643, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
6
5 Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1975-76).
66
Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on the Improvement of Judicial
Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
67 See H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). After this came H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). H.R. 8200 was the bill eventually
passed by the House.
68
See S. 2266 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
69
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101 to 151326 (Supp. III 1979)).
62

63

0

7 ld. § 402.
71 Id. § 547.
2
7 1n addition

to the problems discussed in this article, see Mann & Phillips, supra note 5.
73 See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
74 11

U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp.

m

1979). The full text of § 547(b) is as follows:

Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer
of property of the debtor
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on' account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer
was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4). made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4

10

fall, 198 1]

MannTIMINO
and Phillips:
Timing of Perfection of Security Interests
OF PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS

section 60's four-month time period, and it also substantially dilutes the requirement that the transferee have reasonable cause to believe in the insolvency of the debtor for the transfer to be voidable." Under the Reform Act, if
the preferential transfer occurs on or within ninety days before the filing of
0
the bankruptcy petition, no "reasonable cause to believe" is required." However, the reasonable cause test is retained to render voidable by the trustee
transfers to "insiders"7 7 which occur between ninety days and one year before
the day of bankruptcy."8
Despite these changes, though, section 547(b) would still seem to
present the timing problems discussed above, since the antecedent debt requirement still remains and there still is a definite (albeit different) time
period applicable. But in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection 547(e),'
the Reform Act substantially modifies section 60's timing-of-transfer provision: 8
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph
(3) of this subsection, a transfer is made (A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within
10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.
-

such creditor, at the time of such transfer (i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of such
transfer; and

(5) that
(A)
(B)
(C)

enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
the transfer had not been made; and
such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.

7 See notes 20 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
76 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1979), quoted in note 74 supra.

See id. § 101(25). If the debtor is a corporation, "insiders" are its directors, officers, controlling persons, and general partners; partnerships in which the debtor-corporation is a general partner; and relatives of the debtor's general partners, directors, officers, or controlling
persons. The section defines "insider" status for debtors who are individuals or partnerships
in a roughly similar fashion. The definition also includes affiliates of the debtor, or the
"insider of an -affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor," as well as the managing agent of
the debtor.
78 Id. § 547(b)(4)(B), quoted in note 74 supra.
70 Id. .547.(e)(2) & (3).
sO For a c6mparison to § 547(e) (2), see the text accompanying notes 26.27 supra,.
7
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(3)

For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
Subsection (e) (2) obviously changes the grace period allowed by the
Bankruptcy Act for perfection 1 of security interests and other transfers. If
the transfer is perfected at the time it takes place or within ten days thereafter, then the transfer is deemed to have been "made" for the purposes of
the Reform Act at the time it takes effect between the parties-i.e., the time
of attachment.8 2 Thus, the twenty-one day grace period of the Bankruptcy
Act" has been replaced by a ten-day period." Even more significantly, the
Reform Act's grace period applies to all transfers without regard to any
grace period provided by state law. Thus, the first problem created by section
60's interaction with Article 9-whether the secured party had a grace period
within which to perfect 8 -is resolved by the Reform Act. If such a party
perfects within ten days of attachment, the time of transfer is the time of
attachment. As a result, the transfer cannot be for an antecedent debt, because value must be given for attachment to occur or for the transfer to
be effective." Moreover, except for the "insider" situation,8 7 the transfer will
be deemed to have occurred outside the new 90-day preference period in
situations where attachment takes place at that time and perfection occurs
within ten days, even if this perfection occurs within the 90-day period. 8 In
addition, the creditor seems to be protected even if perfection occurs after
bankruptcy but within the ten-day grace period. In such a situation, the time
of transfer will still be the time of attachment. 9 On the other hand, if the
81 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979) provides that "a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee." Because a party who has
perfected under Article 9 will defeat such a creditor, this definition is substantially in accord
with that of Article 9. Wm & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1002.
-1Id. § 547(e)(2)(A), quoted in the text following note 80 supra, clearly specifies the
moment when the grace period begins and to which subsequent perfection "relates back": it
is the moment that the transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee. For
Article 9 security interests this occurs when the security interest attaches. See U.C.C. §§
9-203(1)-(2). Attachment requires that the debtor have rights in the collateral, U.C.C. §
9-203(1)(c), and U.C.C. 9-301(2)'s grace period begins when the debtor gets possession
of the collateral. Thus, § 547(e)(2) establishes a starting point for measuring grace periods
similar to that of U.C.C. § 9-301(2), thereby substantially eliminating yet another
inconsistency that formerly existed between the Bankruptcy Act and Article 9. On this inconsistency, see note 39 supra.
83 See notes 26, 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
84The Gilmore Report proposed a 21-day grace period. See Gilmore Report, supra note 2,
at 6169-70, 6672-73.
85
See notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
80 See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) and note 10 supra.
87 See notes 74 & 77 supra.
88 However, this situation will not be especially significant because even here the transfer
typically will not be for an antecedent debt.
89 If the ten-day period for perfection has not yet expired when the petition is filed, it can
still be utilized to relate back to the actual time of transfer. In other words, if the
petition is filed a week after a transfer was made, three days are still left to perfect it.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
547.45(3)(b), at 135 (15th ed. 1980).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss2/4
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security interest is perfected after the grace period has elapsed, then the
transfer will be deemed to have been made at either the time of perfection
or immediately before bankruptcy, whichever is earlier."' Here, of course, the
taking of a security interest will usually be preferential unless perfection
occurs before the beginning of the relevant time period for a preference. 9 '
Section 547 (e) also disposes of the second difficulty noted above: section
60's tendency to favor non-purchase money security interests over purchase
money security interests in violation of established Article 9 policies.92
By not employing state law to set the grace period, section 547(e) (2) effectively equates these two types of security interests for timing-of-transfer
purposes. Of course, this still offends the Code policy of favoring purchase
money secured parties. 3 But the drafters of section 547 made some provision
for this difficulty as well. Section 547(c) (3),1, one of the provisions creating
exemptions from section 547's general ban on preferential transfers, states
that:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer
-

of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that
was (i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest
attaches.
This subsection clearly protects purchase money security interests perfected
within ten days of attachment from any sort of preference attack. 5 On its
face, it would seem to add little to the protection already afforded the
purchase money secured party by section 547(e)." But because section
547(e) effectively states that a transfer cannot occur until the debtor acquires rights in the collateral,9" it would not protect a purchase money se(3)

90

See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. II1 1979), in the text following note 80, supra.

91 That is, unless it occurs within 90 days in the normal case, or within one year if the
transfer is to an "insider."
92 See notes 49-56 supra and accompanying text.
93

See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.

ul 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
05WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, at 1006-07.
9 "Because of the ten day grace period in subsection (e), it will seldom be necessary for
even a purchase money lender to invoke this exception. Normally he will protect himself
by filing within ten days of the time the security agreement is signed." Id.
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (Supp. III 1979) quoted in the text following note 80 supra;
82 supra.
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cured party where the debtor does so well after the completion of the security
agreement.9 8 In this case, the transfer would clearly be for an antecedent
debt. However, under section 547(c) (3), such a secured party will still
not be subject to preference attack if he perfects in time.9" Thus, section
547(c)(3) manages to give the purchase money secured party some additional
protection. But it is still not clear that this amounts to much of an advantage over other sorts of secured parties."'
CONCLUSION

Unlike its efforts in some other contexts,' Congress' revisions of section
60 of the Bankruptcy Act seems to have resolved most of the interpretative
problems created by section 60's interaction with Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.' Section 547 effectively provides that security interests
perfected within ten days of attachment will not be preferential. It has also
made it clear that this requirement applies to purchase money and non-purchase money security interests alike. On the other hand, the Reform Act has not
eliminated all of the policy conflicts existing under the prior law. Despite
virtually removing purchase money security interests perfected within ten days
of attachment from attack by the trustee, it does not give them the advantage
over other sorts of security interests envisioned by the Code. And giving
non-purchase money security interests a ten-day grace period for filing
still subverts the Code's policy of encouraging immediate or advance filing.
But in the commercial context at least, clarity is often more valuable than
case-by-case justice, and in bringing some certainty to this area section
547's drafters have performed a signal service for commercial lawyers.
98

[I]t
is possible to have a purchase money case that is not covered by the relation back
provisions. Assume for example that a bank agrees to lend a million dollars to debtor
for the debtor's purchase of some expensive equipment. The parties sign the security
agreement and the loan is made on day one but the collateral is not actually purchased
until day 30 and the filing is not made until day 31. But for the purchase money exception, that transaction could be attacked as a voidable preference notwithstanding

the ten day grace period. Since no transfer can occur until the debtor acquires rights
in the collateral and since the debtor acquired such rights only on the 30th day, the
transfer would be for the antecedent debt that had arisen on day one. Subsection

547(c)(3) will save that transaction; the ten day relation back rule would not save it.
WHITE

&

SUMMERS,

supra note 13, at 1007.

99 id.
100 The

example given in note 98 supra would not appear to be readily replicable in the nonpurchase money context, since it involves the acquisition of collateral well after the giving
of value by the creditor. The principal exception to this generalization would be a security

interest in after-acquired property, the so-called "floating lien", but this too is generally
protected under the Reform Act. See Mann & Phillips, supra note 6, at 12-16.
101 One example is the Reform Act's treatment of the clash between the reclaiming seller
of goods and the trustee under § 546(c), 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (Supp. III 1979). See Mann &
Phillips, Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the
Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. UJ.

239 (1980); Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller Under Bankruptcy Reform Act: Resolution or Renewal of an Old Conflict? 33 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1980).
02
For another Article 9 problem eliminated by the Reform Act, see Mann & Phillips, supra
note.6.
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